


Timeline of Events

The skeleton history of Sudan since British joint rule began in 1899 (below) is designed to help provide context for current issues and developments in Sudan. It is not authoritative, it is not complete, and it is not designed to be used as a definitive record. It is a reference tool with a weighting towards recent events, for those seeking an index of major events and personalities.

Timeline of Events



Phase 1: The Seeds of Future Troubles are Sown

Sudan achieved independence already a year into a civil war, partly due to discrimination against Africans and nomadic peoples of both ethnicities by the British colonial administration. Pan-Arabism from its neighbours caused an influx of arms into Sudan, while natural disasters and displacements of peoples due to the civil wars strained customary land-sharing practices between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.

- 1899**
 - Britain conquered Sudan and governed it through an Egyptian governor as part of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Muslim North Sudan and Christian South Sudan were administered as different regions.
- 1952**
 - Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy in Egypt, as pan-Arabism grew regionally as an ideology.

- 1956**
- Sudan gained independence; the Republic of the Sudan was born. In the run-up to independence the British colonial administrators combined the two Sudanese regions into a single administrative unit and handed control to members of a few northern Sudanese Arab tribes, whom the British felt they could better engage with.
 - Some South Sudanese, resenting the imposition of northern control through the British decolonisation process, had mutinied in 1955, beginning the first Sudanese Civil War that lasted until 1972 and killed one million civilians.
 - **Note:** The political domination by the northern tribes has continued, including their provision of every president from 1956 until the overthrow of Bashir in 2019. Darfuris- both Arab¹ and African²- continue to cite this as a root cause of Sudan's troubles.
- 1972**
- President Nimeiry signed a peace agreement with Joseph Lagu, representing the South Sudanese, ending the first Civil War.
- 1980s**
- Libyan president Gaddafi began arming Darfur's Arabs as part of his pan-Arabist plans for Africa. A clan from the Rezeigat Mahamid sub-tribe, called the Um Jalul, acted as intermediaries; the father of Musa Hilal was one of the central figures in this flow of arms.
- 1983**
- President Nimeiry imposed Islamic law.
 - The Second Sudanese Civil War began, lasting until 2005 and killing two million people. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)³ in Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and what is now South Sudan fought the government for independence, which they gained in 2011.
- 1984-5**
- Drought and famine in Darfur increased farmer-nomad competition for resources. Nomadic pastoralists without defined land rights, especially the African Zaghawa and some of the Arab Rezeigat, who had traditionally relied on customary rights to graze and pass on their neighbours' land, began appropriating or raiding resources as Saharan desertification increased.
 - These mass-displacements of entire ways of life would later express themselves in conflict: the Zaghawa, through JEM and SLA-MM especially, and the Rezeigat, predominantly as Border Guards and then Rapid Support Forces, later became two of the largest protagonists in the Darfurian troubles.

¹ (Hamdan Dagalo, 2019)

² (el-Faki, 2020)

³ The political wing was the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

1985

- The overthrow of President Nimeiri led to the return of Arab fighters from Libyan training camps, with large amounts of small arms. This arming of the population was encouraged by the new President al-Mahdi, who was hoping to mobilize the population to stop the SPLA advancing.

1988-9

- Conflicts broke out in Jebel Marra between farmers and nomads, as increasingly available arms led to violence becoming the predominant mechanism for the resolution of resource competition.

Phase 2: The Bashir Era Begins

Bashir began his thirty-year dictatorship. With his army tied up in the civil war, he turned to arming militias to suppress dissent in Darfur before the civil war could spread there. Arab tribes rejected the mobilisation, but criminal groups – the Janjaweed – took it up.

1989

- Bashir's military coup put him in power for the next thirty years, until 2019.
- Hassan al-Turabi's National Islamist Front, a Muslim Brotherhood party that backed Bashir, started Islamising the Army by replacing officers who refused to convert to political Islam. This process continued until 2019 and has led to a deep-rooted problem with extremism in the senior ranks of the SAF today.
- The Popular Defence Forces (PDF) were established to turn Arab tribal militias into paramilitary units. They were used as a mobilisation vehicle against the SPLA and later other groups, especially the Masalit, receiving only the loot they could capture as pay.

1990s

- Legal reforms led to war in Dar Masalit (the tribal area of the Masalit in West Darfur). With the Second Sudanese Civil War at its peak, the government began to fear that SPLA activities would spread to Darfur.
- The government expanded the use of local armed militias to do the work of the army, which was tied down fighting the SPLA. Criminal gangs with weaker tribal affiliations took up the government offer of arms; these were the origins of arming what would later be collectively called the Janjaweed.
- Darfurian Arab tribes that were asked to mobilise were reluctant to help Khartoum, given their own mistreatment and their dislike of the Janjaweed. They saw the Janjaweed as criminals and called them 'Donkey Thieves' as a put-down.

- 1993 • The US designated Sudan a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
- 1993 • The US began a sanctions regime against Sudan.
- 2002 • Musa Hilal was among Arab tribal leaders arrested by North Darfur Governor General Ibrahim Suliman in order to curtail militia activity, which had grown out of control in the hands of the Janjaweed. While under house arrest in Port Sudan,⁴ Musa Hilal discussed joining Abdel Wahid's fledgling rebel group.
- Abdel Wahid of the Fur founded the SLA-AW, Minni Minawi of the Zaghawa founded the SLA-MM, and Khalil Ibrahim, a civil servant from Khartoum also of the Zaghawa, founded JEM. These became the three principal Darfuri rebel groups and continue to dominate Darfurian affairs today.

Phase 3: Darfur

Bonds of marriage, trade, cohabitation and competition both intensified and complicated the arms race that developed in Darfur as the atrocities began at scale. The government used these factors to enhance rivalry, while arming Darfur through formalised militias under direct government control. A vicious circle of attack and counterattack deepened the conflict, which was in fact a sum of many small but violent conflicts.

- 2003 • JEM launched a raid on the military base at al-Fasher, seizing heavy weapons and destroying the airfield along with a number of aircraft. General Ibrahim was sacked by Khartoum in response.
- The success at al-Fasher stunned Sudan and drew large numbers of recruits to the Darfurian rebel groups. The growing Zaghawa rebel armies (JEM and SLA-MM) started raiding local populations for supplies, alienating some Arab tribes.
- Vice President Ali Osman Taha released Musa Hilal to rally his tribe and help counter the insurgency. Hilal offered tribes in Darfur a choice: arms and training if they joined him, or being attacked if they did not.
- In the 1990s wars in Dar Masalit, the PDF were used as a mobilisation vehicle, but they were not paid, receiving loot only. Musa Hilal's Abbala militiamen wanted proper payment and status, so were mobilised through the newly created Border Guards who had official

⁴ (Flint, 2009 p. 19)

status as government troops and therefore a salary. The Border Guards were commanded by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) officers, formally sitting under Military Intelligence.

- Government militias were not all raised along ethnic lines, however: the African Tunjur tribe and individuals from other ethnic African tribes joined as well as the Arab tribes at the start.
 - The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa refused to join the PDF, and then later Tunjur changed sides to join the rebels. This led the government to comprehensively exclude Africans from militias henceforth, in case they turned their arms and training on the government.
 - Attacks by rebels on Arab resources for supplies led to a feeling among some Arabs that this revolt was partly anti-Arab in character. This, in turn, combined with their own poverty led to some Arab tribes beginning to collectively join the government militias.
 - Many militias were still recruited locally by state governors, not on orders from Khartoum.⁵ Meanwhile numerous central and local government organisations beyond just the PDF and Border Guards were created to give militias official status and protect them from international pressure. The Central Reserve Police (CRP) became a new favourite mobilisation vehicle.
 - The Mahariya, Hemeti's branch of the Rezeigat Arabs, refused to join the government, which started persecuting them. The salaries of all ethnic Mahariya in government were reduced, followed shortly by their comprehensive firing from the entire civil service. The tribe faced a double threat: on the one hand, government persecution; on the other, large numbers of Zaghawa had started arriving in Darfur from Chad (seeking refuge among the rebels). The Mahariya had a long history of close relations with the Zaghawa of Darfur, including frequent inter-marriage, but no links to the new Chadian Zaghawa, some of whom began to attack Mahariya resources.
 - An arms race on all sides turned into a series of ever larger and more violent attacks, often on the populations and resource bases that the armed groups came from. The long history of violence in Darfur had transformed, through a series of attacks and counterattacks, into what we now recognise collectively as the Darfur genocide, affecting the entire population.
- 2004
- Bashir's government denied having any links to the Janjaweed or militias.⁶ In fact, the strategy of offering of cash and weapons to those Arabs who joined the militias, but punishment to those who did not, was still in use in 2007 when some Beni Halba land was appropriated for redistribution to others on these grounds.
 - A Rezeigat camel train was attacked by Zaghawa rebels, with 3,400 camels taken and 77 people kidnapped; this train belonged to Hemeti. He was shortly afterwards approached and armed by the government to defend Nyala from the rebels. Many other small Arab tribes were also recruited as militias at this time as the cycle of violence and revenge grew.

⁵ (Tubiana, 2017 p. 3)

⁶ (Flint, 2009 p. 23)

Zaghawa rebels started attacking Misseriya villages, who in turn accepted government arms to defend themselves.

- Increasing cycles of counterattacks led to international condemnation and spiralled out of government control. UN Special Envoy Jan Pronk told the UN 'the government does not control its own forces fully. It co-opted paramilitary forces and now it cannot count on their obedience.'⁷

Phase 4: The Dynamics Change and the Militias Grow

The end of the civil war with the SPLA and what was about to become South Sudan led to a shift in dynamics in Darfur. Different militia members and rebels joined forces in a cascade of new alliances and rivalries. The government fell into a cycle of raising new militias and paramilitaries to control the previous ones, causing the number of armed men in Darfur destabilise both the financial and security situation nationally.

2005

- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the government and the SPLM, bringing the Second Sudanese Civil War to an end (and leading, six years later, to independence for South Sudan).
- Many PDF members, worried that Khartoum would abandon them after the CPA, joined the Darfurian rebels or the SPLA.
- The Misseriya reconciled with their Birgid neighbours, and as a tribe pulled out of the Darfur war.
- The Abuja peace talks began. Arab herders needed functional relationships with African farmers for the markets in which they sold their animals and bought their supplies to work, so sent a delegation to ensure their interests were represented. This delegation was turned away.
- The UN Independent Commission of Inquiry into Darfur (ICID) stated that 'the judicial system has demonstrated that it lacks adequate structures, authority, credibility, and willingness to effectively prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the alleged crimes that continue to exist in Darfur.'⁸

2006

- Minni Minawi and the government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, the result of the Abuja peace talks. Under its terms, the Janjaweed and militia were to be disarmed, and 5,000 rebels were to join the SAF. Minawi became a senior assistant to Bashir. Land rights were enshrined as belonging to farmers, with no rights going to the herders. Darfur's

⁷ (Pronk, 2004)

⁸ (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005 p. 115)

Arabs felt themselves to be in a position of weakness; the rebels were armed and – so it seemed – were now backed by the government.

- Musa Hilal in North Darfur and Hemeti in South Darfur began discussions with JEM. Each signed their own mutual non-aggression pacts with JEM.
- Numerous agreements were signed between Rezeigat groups and SLA-Abdul Wahid. Hemeti signed one, as did other Mahariya groups. Mahamid groups under commanders other than Musa Hilal also signed them. Finally, one group of mixed Mahamid and Mahariya under Ali Abundigat joined the SLA fully.
- As international knowledge of and condemnation of the events in Darfur grew, it began to appear that the government would not be able to support Musa Hilal any longer. Many paramilitary soldiers began to leave the militias, taking their arms with them, forming groups of for-hire brigands who raided civilians to make a living.
- The government began to distance itself from Musa Hilal and developed their relationship with Hemeti, giving him weapons to fight the rebels (unaware of his pacts with JEM and SLA-AW). The Mahamid started to fear the government would support the Mahariya against, or at least above, themselves.

2007

- The first International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants for Darfur came out: Ali Kushayb (half-Arab half-African) and Ahmed Haroun were both indicted.
- Hemeti, having received government arms, broke away from the government, claiming unpaid salaries and other unkept promises from the government. Numerous other Arab paramilitaries rebelled and attacked government troops to get supplies. Darfur was by now fully out of government control.

2008

- The government tried to disarm the Arab militias but had no power to compel them when they refused. It asked Musa Hilal for help, but he was unable to do so as his influence among the Arabs, and even within his own Mahamid people, had fallen after years of being seen as too close to Khartoum.
- JEM attacked Khartoum in May and nearly captured it.
- The government, stunned by the attack, reversed the militia disarmament. In order to entice the Arab militias to stay on it had to further regularise them within the Border Guards and CRP. The militias believed government identification documents and status would help protect them from international attack. The government, for its part, was trying to get around the provisions of the 2005 CPA that compelled existing armed groups to be disarmed, by creating new units with new names.
- One regularised Arab group was that of An-Nur Ahmad, who had broken away from Musa Hilal in 2006. His men joined both the Border Guards and CRP.
- Hemeti re-joined the government and agreed to return the heavy weapons he had taken from it when he had left. As part of the deal he received: the rank of Lt-General; the incorporation of 3,000 of his men into the SAF; and a cash payment.

2009

- Bashir was indicted by the ICC.
- By now, one third of violent deaths in Darfur were from inter-Arab fighting⁹. Arab tribes had always clashed, but the years of government arming had increased the levels of violence. The government was not able to stop these conflicts as any control it had over the paramilitaries was mostly through pay, and whenever this was not received the soldiers would defect, or even turn on the government itself.

2011

- South Sudan formally went independent, taking with it the majority of Sudan's oil and export revenues.
- The scale of the paramilitary units used to mobilise the Arab tribes had become problematic financially and from a security perspective for the government. The PDF reached total of 100,000,¹⁰ the Border Guards 20,000, and the Central Reserve Police 100,000.¹¹
- Government relations with Musa Hilal continued to worsen as his and his control over the militias weakened further.

2012

- Commercial quantities of gold were discovered in the Jebel Amer region of Sudan. Musa Hilal took control of large amounts of gold production.

Phase 5: The RSF and Rationalisation

The government raised a new paramilitary unit, the RSF, with more structure and better command and control, to rationalise the large numbers of armed men in the country and bring Darfur back under government control. People from other groups were gradually transferred into it. Many of those who were not transferred into it claimed they were part of it anyway to benefit from its formal status.

2013

- The majority of violence in Darfur was as a result of fighting between rogue militias, which now numbered around 200,000 men in total.¹² This contrasted with the 30,000 SAF soldiers in the region, who could not keep control.

⁹ (Flint, 2009 p. 41)

¹⁰ (Ismail, 2019)

¹¹ (Tubiana, 2017 p. 4)

¹² (Tubiana, 2017)

- The Rapid Support Forces were founded by the government, in order to rationalise the huge numbers of paramilitaries and militias in Darfur. The thirty-five-year-old Hemeti was put in charge, under National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) control.¹³
- A number of soldiers from the Border Guards, which had become especially problematic and violent, were put into the newly formed RSF as a way to dilute the power of the Border Guards and bring it under control.
- Musa Hilal asked for his men to be allowed to join the RSF and the regular SAF; these were now the only two properly supported government military units.

2014-16

- The RSF were deployed across Sudan to stop the various rebel insurgencies and militia activities, which they achieved in conjunction with the SAF.
- Numerous militias started calling themselves 'RSF' for prestige and protection, though they did not have any affiliation.
- Hemeti defeated JEM at a battle at al-Nakhara in April 2015, thus keeping Darfur from effectively falling into rebel hands. This was the turning point marking the start of his rise in prominence and popularity with the government.

2016

- A presidential decree put the RSF directly under President's control.
- Tensions between the SAF and RSF grew, as the RSF continued to receive soldiers from other militias being demobilised by the government, as well as running its own recruiting processes, meaning levels of training and discipline dropped.
- The RSF now numbered around 30,000 men.¹⁴
- All other militia groups were by now seeking to be under the RSF banner, including the paramilitary PDF, CRP, and Border Guards, which were claiming at unit level to be RSF members.
- One of the most prominent examples was that of the men of An-Nur Ahmad (who had broken away from Musa Hilal in 2006) who claimed to be part of the RSF. They had, in 2008 (see above), been formally mobilised into the Border Guards and CRP, and were in 2016 under the formal command of the Ministry of Defence. Such claims confused western observers, especially as at the same time some Darfurian African rebels were joining the RSF through its normal recruitment channels. The confusion led to the RSF beginning to be blamed for the collective atrocities that had occurred in Darfur, including those from before it was founded.
- Gamartallah, who had been running the Jebel Amer gold mines since 2011, who also falsely claimed membership of the RSF for his men, further confusing international understanding.

¹³ The command structure between the government and RSF was (perhaps deliberately) left unclear, and changed in 2016. It was, by acts of Parliament, sometimes simultaneously both independent and under NISS/presidential control.

¹⁴ (Ismail, 2019)

- Despite the relative pacification of Darfur by the RSF, many parts remained out of government control. In East Darfur militias raided the house of the state governor, killing two NISS agents.
 - At the height of the European migration crisis, the EU paid Sudan €40m to stop migrants reaching Europe, through training, a command centre in Khartoum, and some surveillance equipment. Some of this may have been allocated to the RSF, a government unit prominently deployed along the Sudan-Libya border.¹⁵ The EU funding and training continued until 2019.
 - Some militants began to leave Libya, where the civil war was intensifying, and entered Sudan, joining the RSF¹⁶ and adding to the RSF's reputational complexity. It became unclear whether movements across the Sudanese border with Libya were RSF soldiers returning to Sudan, or militants entering Sudan in order to subsequently join the RSF.
- 2017**
- A new presidential decree put the RSF under the SAF chain of command, while also declaring it to be independent.
 - A few thousand RSF arrived in Yemen, as part of a deployment within the Saudi-backed coalition that continues until today.
 - Hemeti arrested his own Mahariya paramount chief, Nazir Mohammedein.
 - The RSF arrested Musa Hilal. Hemeti took control of Musa Hilal's Jebel Amer gold mines.
 - The US lifted its sanctions on Sudan.

Phase 6: Bashir is Overthrown and the June 3rd Events

The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) was formed out of mass protests in Khartoum, and it gradually became clear that elements of the government were siding with the protesters. The RSF declared it supported the protests, and after fighting NISS soldiers, Hemeti arrested President Bashir and removed him from office. A military council was set up as an interim government. One area of the protest sit-in developed a reputation as a drugs area and after notifying the protesters, government forces moved in to clear it up on June 3rd, leading to the killing of numerous protesters.

**Dec
2018**

- Discontent at economic problems that had been growing in Khartoum led to the formation of the Forces for Freedom and Change. This was a loose confederation of numerous protest groups, including the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the Sudan Call (an opposition party grouping), the Sudan Revolutionary Front (a coalition of

¹⁵ The Enough Project has argued that at least some of this may have gone to the RSF (Baldo, April 2017), while the EU has maintained it did not (EU EEAS, 2018)

¹⁶ (Tubiana, 2017 p. 11)

the armed rebel groups from across Sudan), and numerous civil society and political opposition groups. It had a fluid and informal structure, no leadership, and operated mostly through social media.

- The FFC launched massive protests in Khartoum. They went to the most senior part of the state – the presidential palace – with their letter of grievances, but nobody met them to receive the letter.

2019

January 9th

- The FFC sit-in moved from the presidential palace to the next most senior organ of state, the parliament, to hand their letter in there. Again, nobody came to receive it.
- The first signs appeared that something was different in the national dynamics; five protesters broke into the parliament building, but the police protected them instead of shooting them.
- The next day, NISS troops attacked the peaceful demonstration. Protestors ran into the military hospital opposite parliament, and the doctors there – ranking military personnel – let them in before locking NISS out. NISS fired smoke grenades into the hospital but were held off.

April 6th

- Having been ignored by parliament, the protests moved to the third most powerful organ of state, the military HQ, still trying to submit their letter.
- The camp began to develop a more permanent feel as people settled in for a long protest, emboldened by the signs that political and security apparatus sentiment might be different this time.
- An area nicknamed 'Colombia' developed at the end of the sit-in location, named for the availability of illegal drugs. Alcohol sellers, drug dealers, and petty criminals mixed with protestors and youths who wanted to relax and enjoy the newfound social freedoms. RSF members were also celebrating with the protestors, and 'protesters expressed happiness that they were bonding with the soldiers'.¹⁷
- Sala Gosh, the former NISS head and now National Security Adviser, deployed NISS agents under cover into Colombia to gather information and carry out low-level operations for him.

April 9th

- Bashir ordered the RSF to open fire on the protestors and clear the protest area. Hemeti refused.

¹⁷ (Amin, 2019)

2019

April
11th

- The RSF publicly declared it supported the protesters, with the army quickly following suit. This left only NISS still siding with Bashir, leading to skirmishes between the RSF and NISS around Khartoum.
- The skirmishes led to the heads of the different security units (excluding NISS) calling a meeting. They decided that Bashir should be arrested, and nominated the Inspector General of the SAF, General al-Burhan, to do so. The arrest was carried out peacefully. Thirty years of military dictatorship came to an end.
- The Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established as head of state, with Lt General Ibn Auf in charge. He resigned after a day and nominated al-Burhan to take over, with Hemeti as his deputy.

April-May

- The sit-in continued as protesters demanded a civilian government. The SPA emerged as the main negotiating counterparty from within the FFC.

May
20th

- Some protesters digging up the roads in Khartoum to make roadblocks were shot and killed. Hemeti immediately ordered an investigation into who had been responsible. He then made a public statement saying that the ongoing protests were welcome, but complete lawlessness around the capital was not.
- The TMC warned that the situation in Colombia was getting out of hand. NISS agents, still loyal to Bashir's regime, and the criminals there were increasing the amounts of drugs and crime in the area. The TMC feared that NISS agents in the area would unsettle the peaceful dynamic as the TMC and FFC (through the SPA) negotiated a new government structure. To this end, the TMC asked the SPA to withdraw its protesters from Colombia, so the area could be cleaned up.
- The SPA duly asked its protesters to temporarily leave Colombia.¹⁸

June
2nd

- The Joint Task Force, the combined security service tactical command body, informed the protesters that the next day they would enter Colombia to clear it out.

Jun
3rd

- At 4am a group of mixed government forces including police, RSF, army, and NISS, entered Colombia.
- Small skirmishes broke out between government forces, protesters, criminals, and Sala Gosh's undercover NISS agents, with unclear reports of numerous parties fighting each other.
- Rumours began to spread among the protesters that the skirmishes were the first signs that the government was using Colombia as a first step to clearing out the wider,

¹⁸ (Amin, 2019)

legitimate, protest area. More protesters went towards Colombia, leading to more government forces also entering and the magnitude of the operation growing.

- As well as confrontations between the government units and protesters, there were confrontations between out-of-control NISS agents and the protesters, and reports of open gun fights between the RSF and NISS agents.
- Over the course of the day the operation resulted in numerous deaths of protesters as well as sexual violence and other beatings. Numbers of those killed have not been agreed but most reports indicate around 100 deaths.

Phase 7: A New Government, Peace, and Progress.

Progress has been made on all fronts. The first peace agreement with an armed rebel group has been signed; Sudan has its first two women heads of state; and its first Christian head of state; a timetable to elections has been agreed. A mixed civilian-military council rules the country and there is peace in fact, if not yet on paper, for the first time since before independence in 1956.

- June 12th**
 - The TMC and SPA resumed talks over the future government for Sudan.
- June 5th**
 - The AU mediators in the peace talks announced that an agreement on government institutions had been reached in principle.
- July 17th**
 - The political agreement was signed.
- August 4th**
 - A draft constitutional charter was agreed between the FFC and TMC.
- August 17th**
 - The charter was signed by Hemeti (deputy head of the TMC) and Ahmed Rabee of the FFC.
- August 20th**
 - The new government came into power, according to the July 17th political agreement and August 17th charter. An eleven-member Sovereignty Council took over from the TMC as head of state, and the TMC was dissolved.
 - The new system involved:
 - The creation of an eleven-member Sovereignty Council as head of state, consisting of five military personnel, five civilians, and one civilian agreed by each side;

- A transition period of thirty-nine months under the Sovereignty Council, the first twenty-one of which would be under a military head of the Council, and the last eighteen under a civilian head;
- National elections at the end of the transition period, in November 2022;
- A cabinet of ministers and a Prime Minister to be appointed, with a legislative council underneath them;
- All members of the Sovereignty Council to be declared ineligible to stand in the elections; and
- An investigation into the June 3rd events.
- The Sovereignty Council included two women and one Christian, both firsts as heads of state for Sudan.
- Abdalla Hamdok was appointed Prime Minister. General Burhan, as leader of the Sovereignty Council became President, and Hemeti as deputy leader of the Sovereignty Council the Vice President.

September
6th

- The Minister for Religious Affairs in Sudan called for the Jewish community to return to Sudan.¹⁹

September
11th

- An agreement for peace talks was signed between the Sovereignty Council and the Darfurian rebels.

November
28th

- Bashir's former party, the National Congress Party (NCP), was dissolved. His Public Order Act was overturned, ending the restrictive rules on women's clothing and no longer compelling them to wear headscarves.

December
4th

- US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that Sudan and the US would exchange ambassadors for the first time in twenty-three years.²⁰

December
14th

- Sudan's judiciary, now led for the first time by a woman, Nemat Abdallah Kheir, jailed former president Bashir.

December
18th

- The US removed Sudan from the list of Countries of Particular Concern for religious freedom.²¹

¹⁹ (The Times of Israel, 2019)

²⁰ (France 24, 2019)

²¹ (Pompeo, 2019)

2019

December
22nd

- The government opened a comprehensive investigation into the crimes committed in Darfur since 2003

December
29th

- Fighting between Rezeigat Arabs and African Masalit in Darfur led to the death of over fifty people.

2020

January
14th

- Former NISS agents, being demobilised as part of the changes to NISS, mutinied and opened fire with heavy weapons in Khartoum and locations across the country. They then turned to robbing and attacking civilians, before the RSF and other government forces ended the mutiny.

January
20th

- In a sign of the changing political environment, Omer Ismail was appointed State Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had fled into exile in 1989 and lived in America since then, becoming one of Bashir's – and the RSF's – fiercest critics through his work at the Enough Project.

January
24th

- The first peace agreement between the Sudanese government and an armed rebel group was signed, with the SPLA-N of Malik Agar.²²

January
28th

- Prime Minister Hamdok wrote to the UN asking for a new relationship between the UN and Sudan with a larger focus on civil efforts.

February
11th

- Sudan agreed to hand former President Bashir to the ICC.

February
13th

- The German Bundestag voted to resume bilateral economic cooperation with Sudan, for the first time since 1989.

²² The SPLA-N is the part of the SPLA that was attached to lands that remained under Sudanese, as opposed to South Sudanese, dominion after the CPA of 2006. It has fought the Sudanese government since South Sudan's independence in 2011, from bases in Kordofan and Blue Nile, together referred to as the 'Two Areas'. There are two major groups, that of Malik Agar and that of al-Hilu.

- March 1st**
 - The government sacked 50 ambassadors who had been appointed during Bashir's regime, along with a large number of other consular staff. This followed the removal of junior officers from the army in February.
 - The EU announced its ongoing support the current transition in Sudan, and pledged €100m in aid.
- March 5th**
 - Finance Minister al-Badawi revealed that due to a lack of foreign currency reserves the government had borrowed money from a private business in order to pay for wheat, fuel, and medicine subsidies.
- March 9th**
 - A car bomb was detonated as Prime Minister Hamdok's convoy drove past in Khartoum. The assassination attempt failed and Hamdok was unharmed. The FBI sent a team to support the investigation on the ground.
- March 18th**
 - Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Mining announced that gold mines pledged by Hemeti in December had indeed been given to the state.
- March 25th**
 - Sudanese Defence Minister, Jamal Omer, died from a heart attack while in Juba for the peace negotiations with the armed rebel groups. Talks were put on hold for a week, after which the spread of Covid-19 led to the talks moving online and a further delay.
- April 3rd**
 - Having agreed damages for families of the victims of the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 by al-Qaeda, for which the US held the Sudanese government liable, the government of Sudan made the payment and petitioned to have the case closed. The government of Sudan expressly stated that it did not accept responsibility for any of al-Qaeda's attacks, but was making the payment in order to have itself removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The US has stated that compensation payments for the USS Cole, and also for the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, are a prerequisite to removal from the list. Negotiations regarding the embassy bombings continue.
- April 13th**
 - The representatives of the armed rebel groups, the SRF, made a declaration of support for the peace process in Juba, in response to Minni Minawi, leader of SLA-MM, walking out of the talks. Minawi rejoined two days later.

- The Umma party, led by former President Sadiq al-Mahdi, suspended its role in the FFC. He blamed the civilian groups of the FFC for political infighting and delaying economic development, and blamed the armed groups for making excessive demands at the peace talks.
- Three days later Malik Agar, leader of the armed rebel movement SPLA-Agar, also called on the FFC to reform.

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